In this book Wright tells the story of a planet where biological and social complexity both arise out of largely similar core processes: evolution via natural selection plus technological innovation plus 'non-zero sum' dynamics.
In short, 'zero-sum' interactions occur wherever one player's gain is another player's loss - where the net value to be obtained out of the interaction must sum to zero (think duel to the death). 'Non-zero sum' interactions occur wherever certain actions by players may lead to gains by both players. The language of games and players comes out of game theory – the classic non-zero sum game being the Prisoners' Dilemma, about which much has been written. The interesting bit here is that our 'players' may be humans, but they might also be genes, chromasomes, molecules, organs or memes. Memes are theorised units of cultural evolution: they replicated, mutate and survive insofar as they successfully colonise 'niches' within human minds. The meme for the belief “slavery is fine” isn't doing so well at the moment, but the meme for “we should try to stop global warming” is doing pretty well. The existence of non-zero sum interactions doesn't guarantee that the players actually choose actions which realise the potential positive sums, it simply provides a potential for mutual gain.
One approach to the talk of non-zero sumness would be to say “so what, he's just saying that co-operation is good for everyone.” But as Wright points out, there are many non-zero sum interactions which don't look much like cooperation at all. When you buy a watch made in China you are involved in a non-zero sum interaction with the factory worker who assembled it — you get a cheap watch, he gets paid (hopefully) but the relationship hardly constitutes cooperation. Alternatively, mitochondrial DNA and regular nuclear DNA both benefit from their contributions to the reproduction of a eukaryotic cell, but again, calling it cooperation would be stretching the meaning of the word pretty far.
Wright writes the book from a fairly hard-line technological determinist perspective (which at first I found disappointing, but it paved a solid path on which to ground more speculative considerations near the end of the book). What allows the non-zero sum interactions to expand over time, in number and scope, is the availability of certain technologies (as he says: “Add technology and bake for five millenia”). The two critical types of technology are: information technologies, which allow quicker, more accurate transmission and processing of information (writing, the invention of money, printing, the internet); and trust technologies, which produce an environment where the procedures and outcomes of interactions are increasingly stable and predictable (authority of the chief of a village, rule of law, contracts).
Add to this his claim that humans have an innate tendency to innovate — to find new ways of doing stuff. This in itself is a predictable outcome of evolution powered by non-zero sum interactions: humans who were less interested with tinkering with stuff are less likely to stumble across cool new tools that help further harness potential non-zero sum interactions. As information and trust technologies progress, those with access to them can productively realise the benefits of non-zero-sum interactions with more and more people who live further and further away. These increasingly large and interconnected social units, armed with good information processing and some semblence of stability, operate effectively as social/collective brains — creating feedback loops which increase innovation and so on. This is what leads to the broadening of complexity and geographical scope of human collectivities: nomadic tribes to villages to chiefdoms to towns to city-states to fully fledged nation states to some possible future institution of global governance. All pretty neat, right?
As any history-of-everything is, Wright's story is very selective. But it is also well considered, and tackles many of the important questions along the way: why did humans make the leap to agriculture when life what pretty cruisy as a hunter-gatherer? why did the industrial revolution happen in western Europe, even though China was far more advanced technologically, hundreds of years beforehand? didn't civilization nearly get 'lost' in the middle ages anyway? what about the continuous threat of the 'barbarian hordes' — aren't they a counterexample to the story of increasing complexity? if non-zero sum interactions always tend towards larger social organisations, why did all the big empires collapse? For someone who hasn't read much history, there are many interesting stories here.
Wright generally reads history in an optimistic light — even given all the horrors of war, , genocide, famine and disaster, human societies have basically moved consistently in the direction of greater individual freedom and wider distribution of power. Although war was often a potent tool in engendering stability within social units (and hence increasing non-zero sum potential locally), increasingly our interdependence is making all-out war a less and less productive strategy. This is not to say that we can't screw it all up by dropping A-bombs everywhere, but it is the increasingly negative-sum nature of war that makes it less and less palatable: “Hate ain't what it used to be”. The rise of the internet is the next big thing in information technology and prefigures the arrival of masses of new potential non-zero sumness, if we can develop sufficient trust technologies to catch up with all the potential. It also heralds some good news on the social front: “...the most ambitious realistic hope for the future of amity — a world in which just about everyone holds allegiance to enough different groups, with enough different kinds of people, so that plain old-fashioned bigotry would entail discomfiting cognitive dissonance. It isn't that everyone will love everyone, but rather that everyone will like enough different kinds of people to make hating any given type problematic.”
The sad part, however, about the story is that history's progress is still framed largely in terms of human beings' self-interest (and correspondingly their genes'). Sure, cooperation evolves with near certainty as the devlopment of technology broadens the scope of potential non-zero sum interactions, but in the end this is only because engaging in more non-zero sum games brings windfalls of material goods, status and sex for the players (there is a complete ignorance of any questions of gender here — it's always the men getting the sex...).
This is a bit of a caricature though — Wright admits his story is partial, and there are many complications surrounding selection at the level of the gene, organism and group. But the question I think it raises is an interesting one: yes human beings are often selfish, we do like to accumulate things and status. But we are also genuinely caring and innately socially minded. “Aha,” the critics will say “but all this altruism evolved only because it served your innate self interest, therefore it is not really altruism, just selfishness disguised as unselfishness.” Well, maybe, but no one claims that just because we evolved from apes that we are actually apes. In fact, by the above line of argument you may as well say that humans are in fact just primordial slime from which all life evolved. My point is that just because we can theorise how our innate tendencies towards cooperation, altruism and love might have arisen because they served the replicative needs of our genes, it doesn't mean that the resulting altruism is actually selfishness. The response should be quite the opposite – isn't it amazing and wonderful how essential selfishness could evolve into real, genuine altruism! Of course we're still pretty much beginners at this whole altrusim thing. Wright does point to a sort of necessary spiritual transformation but, typical of his cautious style, doesn't elaborate, and sticks with the nuts and bolts.
After being a bit underwhelmed by the materialistic and economic style of Wright's major arguments, I was quite impressed with his movement into the problem of consciousness and more theological speculations. Far from solving the intriguing problem of consciousness, he reminds us, modern science has actually emphasised its mystery. By showing that the brain operates consistently and coherently as a purely physical system, with no apparent need for 'input' from a conscious inhabitant, modern neurosciences have in fact highlighted its own inability to explain consciousness. If consciounsness doesn't appear to do anything, then why does it exist? Why did consciousness evolve if it doesn't achieve anything? Why is it like anything to be alive, to feel? Science cannot explain this because there is just no evidence that consciousness is useful to explain anything in the material world, it's just neurotransmitters and action potentials in there. This makes the question of what the heck consciousness is much more interesting and important than ever. The best explanation so far is that consciousness is some sort of correlate of increasing density and speed of information processing, which matches up with the idea of human collectivities operating as 'social brains'. Consequently, Wright asks — could a global brain ever become conscious? I think he misses the most obvious point here: even if neurons do have some sort of limited consciousness of their own, their consciousness is not identical to the consciousness of the whole brain. As a corollary, even if a true global consciousness could emerge (or has emerged!) we would not have access to the experience of that consciousness, as we are but the neurons, not the whole brain. However dissapointing this may be, it's still an interesting line of thought: human beings + internet may well be conscious, but me might never know it.
Although relying on the random processes of mutation and selection, the combination of self-replication and non-zero sum dynamics produces, according to NZ, a systematic tendency towards evolutionary units of higher and higher complexity. Major debates about the notion of 'progress' aside (insert 100 years of debate here), this places Wright within a movement exploring notions of models and scales of human development. A central qualification of his argument is that although we, as homo sapiens, with our particular version of a highly complex, globally integrated society were incredibly unlikely to have eventuated (given all the randomness of evolution), it is almost certain that some kind of highly complex, intelligent, integrated organims would have arisen out of the same primordial goop that produced us. Given enough time, and escape from giant meteors and invading aliens, something resembling us would eventually develop. This is directly contra the well known writer Stephen Jay Gould who sees us as an altogether very unlikely accident, and that's all. If somewhere along the way homo sapiens had all been obliterated by a meteor then, according to Gould, that was our one and only chance, gone.
These arguments lead to an interesting discussion concerning in precisely what way (once we admit the importance of non-zero sum dynamics and the tendency towards complexity) we can say that evolution has a 'goal', or shows evidence of 'design'. I've always been extremely tetchy about people who talk about natural selection 'designing' things (eyes, cell walls etc) but Wright makes some points that help tease out the concept. If you belive NZ progress in a restricted sense, and indeed intelligence and possibly consciousness, are so deeply embedded in the natural world that we cannot ignore it. In the end it might come down to questions of semantics whether we read this tendency as 'design' or not (with one huge caveat to destroy any quacky notions of intelligent design coming from Kentucky). Although not pursued by Wright, I think this connects back to the discussion of consciousness: 'design', 'purpose', 'intention' are all things that only arise in relation to consciousness. So by definition (if we belive the neuroscientists) we can never find these things in the physical world, as consciousness is not a feature of the physical world. The uncomfortability in Wright's discussion I think arises from his attempt to place it there. But if we imagine the world in its totality (as an information processing system) as potentially engendering some sort of meta-consciousness, then it might seem possible to speak of such things as design, intention, purpose at that level.
Read in comparison to Wilber's SES (see book reivew posted on this blog 5/9/2007), NZ is easily an order of magnitude less bold. But because of this, it requires you to take a lot less on faith and appeals much more to common sense and empirical history. What NZ does that Wilber doesn't, is provide a coherent mechanism to explain evolution's remarkable tendency towards higher complexity and apparent 'progress' (however much you dispute the term), without invoking some mysterious 'Omega Point'. Although Wright flirts speculatively with the notion of a teleology or goal-directedness in evolution, his prime movers are always replication, mutation, zero and non-zero sum interactions and lots of time. The interesting implication for our own little slice of history is that the feedback loops of evolution — technology begets more non-zero sumness begets technology — mean that increases in complexity and global interconnection may be on an accellerating gradient, reducing the amount of the 'time' ingredient necessary to bake the next round of tasty evolutionary cakes. In sum, we might be in for an interesting ride within our lifetime.